

Structure of optimal decentralized control policies

An axiomatic approach



Aditya Mahajan
Yale

Joint work with: Demos Teneketzis (UofM), Sekhar Tatikonda (Yale),
Ashutosh Nayyar (UofM), Serdar Yüksel (Queens)

March 1, 2010, Notre Dame



Decentralized systems
are everywhere ...



Examples of decentralized systems

Communication Systems

- ▶ Wireless networks
- ▶ Cognitive radios
- ▶ Multimedia communication
- ▶ Scheduling and routing in Internet
- ▶ Social networks

Surveillance and Sensor Nets

- ▶ Disaster monitoring
- ▶ Calibration and validation of remote sensing observations
- ▶ Fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles
- ▶ Intruder detection in networks

Networked control sys


- ▶ Manufacturing plants
- ▶ Transportation networks
- ▶ Real-time route scheduling
- ▶ Aerospace applications

And many more . . .

- ▶ Coordination in robotics
- ▶ On-time diagnosis in nuclear power plants
- ▶ Fault monitoring in power grids
- ▶ Task scheduling in multi-core CPUs




Real-time communication



M-Teneketzi, TIT 09




Broadcast with feedback



M, Allerton 09




MAC with feedback



M, ITA 10




Control over noisy channels



M-Teneketzi, SICON 09




Calibration and validation of remote sensing



Shuman-Nayyar-M-*et al.* Proc IEEE, 10, JSTARS 10



On-time diagnosis with communication



Basic research premise

- © The various applications where decentralized systems arise are **independent areas of research** with dedicated communities.



Basic research premise

- ③ The various applications where decentralized systems arise are **independent areas of research** with dedicated communities.
- ③ Nonetheless, these applications share **common features** and **common design principles**.



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- ③

Develop a **systematic methodology**
that addresses these commonalities.



Basic research premise

- ③ The various applications where decentralized systems arise are **independent areas of research** with dedicated communities.
- ③ Nonetheless, these applications share **common features** and **common design principles**.
- ③

Develop a **systematic methodology** that addresses these commonalities.

- ③ Such a methodology will provide **design guidelines** for all applications.



Systematic design of decentralized systems

Structure of optimal policies

The data at the controllers increases with time, leading to a doubly exponential increase in the number of policies.

When can an agent, or a group of agents,

- ▶ shed available information
- ▶ compress available information

without loss of optimality?



Systematic design of decentralized systems

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Search of optimal policies

- ▶ Brute force search of an optimal policy has doubly exponential complexity with time-horizon.
- ▶ How can we search for an optimal policy efficiently?
- ▶ How can we implement an optimal policy efficiently?



Systematic design of decentralized systems

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Design principles

- ▶ Can we check if the optimal design of a decentralized system is tractable, **without actually designing the system?**

Search of optimal policies

- ▶ Brute force search of an optimal policy has doubly exponential complexity with time-horizon.

- ▶ How can we search for an optimal policy efficiently?

- ▶ How can we implement an optimal policy efficiently?

- ▶ Can we provide additional information to agents to make the design tractable? If so, can we find the smallest such information?



Outline

1. Why are decentralized systems difficult: an example
2. Overview of decentralized systems
 - ▶ Classification
 - ▶ Literature overview
3. Overview of centralized stochastic control
4. Systematic derivation of structural properties
 - ▶ Shed irrelevant information
 - ▶ Compress common information
5. Automated derivation using graphical models
6. Conclusion



Multiaccess broadcast



|||||

Multiaccess broadcast

MAB Channel

- ▶ Single user transmits ⇒ 😊
- ▶ both users transmit ⇒ 😞

Transmitters

- ▶ Packet arrival is independent Bernoulli process
- ▶ Queues with buffer of size 1
- ▶ Packet held in queue until successful transmission

Channel feedback

- ▶ A user knows whether its transmission was successful or not.



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Policy of transmitter

$$U_t^i = g_{i,t}(X_{1:t}^i, U_{1:t-1}^i, Z_{1:t-1})$$



Multiaccess broadcast



Policy of transmitter

$$U_t^i = g_{i,t}(X_{1:t}^i, U_{1:t-1}^i, Z_{1:t-1})$$

Objective

Maximize throughput or minimize delay

- ▶ Avoid collisions
- ▶ Avoid idle

MAB Channel

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- ▶ both users transmit \Rightarrow 😞

Transmitters

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Channel feedback

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History of multiaccess broadcast

Hluchyj and Gallager, NTC 81

- ▶ Considered symmetric arrival rates
- ▶ Restricted attention to “window protocols”



Design Questions

- ◎ **Difficulty:** Data at the controllers increases with time.
 - ▶ Number of control policies increases doubly exponentially with time, making search for optimal policy difficult.
 - ▶ Difficult to implement control functions with time increasing domain



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Design Questions

- ③ **Difficulty:** Data at the controllers increases with time.
 - ▶ Number of control policies increases doubly exponentially with time, making search for optimal policy difficult.
 - ▶ Difficult to implement control functions with time increasing domain
- ③ Hluchyj and Gallager circumvented the difficulty by restricting attention to “window protocols”.
- ③ Is such a restriction optimal?

Ooi and Wornell consider a relaxed problem whose optimal solution (found numerically!) happens to be identical to the strategy of Hluchyj and Gallager.



Design Questions

- ① **Difficulty:** Data at the controllers increases with time.

Even simple problems remain unresolved for decades



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Ooi and Wornell consider a relaxed problem whose optimal solution (found numerically!) happens to be identical to the strategy of Hluchyj and Gallager.




Outline


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2. **Overview of decentralized systems**
 - ▶ **Classification**
 - ▶ **Literature overview**
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
Classification of decentralized systems





Classification of decentralized systems



Classification of decentralized systems




Classification of decentralized systems




We are interested in

Sequential dynamic teams



with non-classical information structures



Literature Overview : Economics

TEAM DECISION PROBLEMS¹

BY R. RADNER

University of California, Berkeley

1. Introduction. In a *team decision problem* there are two or more decision variables, and these different decisions can be made to depend upon different aspects of the environment, i.e., upon different information variables. For ex-

ECONOMIC THEORY OF TEAMS

by
JACOB MARSCHAK and ROY RADNER



Yale University Press, New Haven and London
1972

Literature Overview : Controls

SIAM J. CONTROL
Vol. 9, No. 2, May 1971

ON INFORMATION STRUCTURES, FEEDBACK AND CAUSALITY*

H. S. WITSENHAUSEN†

Abstract. A finite number of decisions, indexed by $\alpha \in A$, are to be taken. Each decision amounts to selecting a point in a measurable space $(U_\alpha, \mathcal{F}_\alpha)$. Each decision is based on some information fed back from the system and characterized by a subfield \mathcal{I}_α of the product space $(\prod_\alpha U_\alpha, \prod_\alpha \mathcal{F}_\alpha)$. The decision function for each α can be any function γ_α measurable from \mathcal{I}_α to \mathcal{F}_α .

PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE, VOL. 59, NO. 11, NOVEMBER 1971

1557

Separation of Estimation and Control for Discrete Time Systems

HANS S. WITSENHAUSEN, MEMBER, IEEE

Invited Paper

Literature Review : Negative results

- ▶ H.S. Witsenhausen, *counterexample in stochastic control*, SICON 1968

Linear policies are not optimal for linear quadratic Gaussian systems under non-classical information structure

- ▶ D.S. Bernstein, S. Zilberstein, and N. Immerman, 2000

In general, the problem is NEXP-complete:
no polynomial time solution can exist.



Literature Review : Few general results

- ▶ Standard form: Witsenhausen 1973
- ▶ Non-classical LQG problems: Sandell and Athans, 1974
- ▶ Multi-criteria problems: Basar, 1978
- ▶ Equivalence of static and dynamic teams: Witsenhausen 1988
- ▶ Non-sequential systems: Andersland and Teneketzis, 1992 and 1994.
- ▶ Two agent teams: M, 2008.



Literature Review: Specific info structures

- ▶ Partially nested info structures, Ho and Chu, 1972, Ho, Kastner, and Wong, 1978, Ho, 1980
- ▶ Delayed sharing info structures, Witsenhausen 1971, Varaiya and Walrand, 1978, Mahajan, Nayyar, and Teneketzis 2010.
- ▶ Common past, Aicardi *et al* 1987
- ▶ Partially observed and partially nested, Casalino *et al* 1984
- ▶ Periodic sharing info structure, Ooi *et al* 1997
- ▶ Tower info structures, Swigart and Lall 2008
- ▶ Stochastic nested and belief sharing, Yüksel 2009
- ▶ P-classical and P-quasiclassical, Mahajan and Yüksel, 2010



Current state of affairs

- ③ Decentralized systems with non-classical information structures are studied on a **case-by-case basis**.
- ③ Results are **hard to generalize** for even a slightly different setup



Develop a **systematic**
methodology to
derive structure of
optimal decentralized
control policies

DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING

RICHARD BELLMAN

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PROBABILITY AND MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS
A Series of Monographs and Textbooks
**INTRODUCTION TO
STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING**
SHELDON M. ROSS

Applied
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Sciences

O. Hernández-Lerma


**Adaptive
Markov Control
Processes**

DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING

Models and Applications

Overview of centralized stochastic control

CONSTI MARKOV DECISION PROCESSES



Eitan Altman

CHAPMAN & HALL/CRC

STOCHASTIC MODELING
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Markov Decision Processes Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming

MARTIN L. PUTERMAN


WILEY SERIES IN PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS

Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control

DIMITRI P. BERTSEKAS


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


Centralized stochastic control


Single decision maker



with classical information structures



MDP: Structural properties





Structure of optimal policy

Choose current
action based on
current state X_t



MDP: Structural properties





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


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


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


POMDP: Structural properties



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POMDP: Structural properties





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$\Pr(\text{state of system} \mid \text{all data at agent})$



POMDP: Structural properties





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
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



Structural policies in stochastic control

© Structure of optimal policies

- ▶ **Shed irrelevant** information
- ▶ **Compress relevant** information to a compact statistic
- ▶ Hopefully, the data at the agent is not increasing with time



Extending ideas to decentralized control




Outline

1. Why are decentralized systems difficult: an example
2. Overview of decentralized systems
 - ▶ Classification
 - ▶ Literature overview
3. Overview of Markov decision theory
4. **Systematic derivation of structural properties**
 - ▶ **Shed irrelevant information**
 - ▶ **Compress common information**
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Shedding irrelevant
information

Can we generalize the reasoning of MDPs to decentralized systems



|||||

The textbook proof

Define: $V_t(x_1, \dots, x_t) = \min_{\text{all policies}} E^g \left\{ \sum_{s=t}^T c(X_s, U_s) \mid x^t \right\}$

Define: $W_t(x_t) = \min_{\text{policies with req. structure}} E^g \left\{ \sum_{s=t}^T c(X_s, U_s) \mid x_t \right\}$

By definition: $W_t(x_t) \geq V_t(x_1, \dots, x_t)$ for any x_1, \dots, x_t .

Recursively prove: $W_t(x_t) \leq V_t(x_t, \dots, x_t)$ for any x_1, \dots, x_t .



The textbook proof

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

$$W_t(x_t) = V_t(x_1, \dots, x_t) \text{ for all } x_1, \dots, x_t$$



The textbook proof

I

Proof tied to
centralized system...



$$W_t(x_t) = V_t(x_1, \dots, x_t) \text{ for all } x_1, \dots, x_t$$



Is there a proof that
can be extended to
decentralized systems?

The main idea

Suppose we have to minimize cost from the p.o.v. of one agent and

$$E[\text{cost} \mid \text{all data}] = F(\text{relevant data}, \text{control action})$$



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Suppose we have to minimize cost from the p.o.v. of one agent and

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Without loss of optimality, choose
control action = $g(\text{relevant data})$.



The main idea

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$$E[\text{cost} \mid \text{all data}] = F(\text{relevant data}, \text{control action})$$

Without loss of optimality, choose
control action = $g(\text{relevant data})$.

Rest is just a matter of detail.



The main idea

- Step 1. Pick an agent
- Step 2. If the agent observes any **irrelevant data**, ignore those observations
- Step 3. Repeat





The main idea

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Step 2. If the agent observes any **irrelevant data**, ignore those observations

Step 3. Repeat



Is easy to extend to decentralized systems ...



Multiaccess broadcast



$$U_t^i = g_{i,t}(X_{1:t}^i, U_{1:t-1}^i, Z_{1:t-1})$$

X_t = state of queue

U_t = Tx or not

Z_t = Channel feedback



Multiaccess broadcast



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X_t = state of queue

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Remove irrelevant data

Conditioned on $(X_t^i, U_t^i, Z_{1:t-1})$, the future reward $R_{t+1:T}$ is independent of past $(X_{1:t-1}^i, U_{1:t-1}^i)$.



Multiaccess broadcast



$$U_t^i = g_{i,t}(X_{1:t}^i, U_{1:t-1}^i, Z_{1:t-1})$$

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Z_t = Channel feedback

Remove irrelevant data



Conditioned on $(X_t^i, U_t^i, Z_{1:t-1})$, the future reward $R_{t+1:T}$ is independent of past $(X_{1:t-1}^i, U_{1:t-1}^i)$.

$$U_t^i = g_{i,t}(X_t^i, Z_{1:t-1})$$



Compressing
relevant information

Can we generalize the reasoning of POMDPs to decentralized systems



The textbook proof

- Find sufficient statistic for performance analysis

$$\pi_t = \Pr(\text{state} \mid \text{all data})$$



The textbook proof

- Find sufficient statistic for performance analysis

$$\pi_t = \Pr(\text{state} \mid \text{all data})$$

- This sufficient statistic can be updated recursively!



$$\pi_{t+1} = F(\pi_t, U_t, Y_t)$$



The textbook proof

- Find sufficient statistic for performance analysis

Proof tied to centralized system...



|||||

Solution Approach

- Given a group of agents, their **coordinator** observes data that is commonly available at all agents and tells each agent what to do with its private data.



Solution Approach

- ③ Given a group of agents, their **coordinator** observes data that is commonly available at all agents and tells each agent what to do with its private data.
- ③ Optimal design of the coordinator is **equivalent** to the optimal design of all agents in the group.



Solution Approach

- ③ Given a group of agents, their **coordinator** observes data that is commonly available at all agents and tells each agent what to do with its private data.
- ③ Optimal design of the coordinator is **equivalent** to the optimal design of all agents in the group.
- ③ If the data at each agent in the group is increasing with time, **the problem at the coordinator is centralized.**
- ③ Use results from POMDP to compress the data at the controller to a sufficient statistic. That is also **a sufficient statistic for the commonly observed data** for each agent in the group.



Multiaccess broadcast




$$u_t^1 = g_{1,t}(X_t^1, Z_{1:t-1})$$

$$u_t^2 = g_{2,t}(X_t^2, Z_{1:t-1})$$



Coordinator of a system




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Coordinator of a system



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
$$u_t^2 = g_{2,t}(X_t^2, Z_{1:t-1})$$

Chooses partial functions

$$(\gamma_t^1, \gamma_t^2) = \psi(Z_{1:t-1}), \quad \gamma_t^i : \mathcal{X}^i \rightarrow \mathcal{U}$$



Coordinator of a system



$$u_t^1 = g_{1,t}(X_t^1, Z_{1:t-1})$$
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

$$(\gamma_t^1, \gamma_t^2) = \psi(Z_{1:t-1}), \quad \gamma_t^i : \mathcal{X}^i \rightarrow \mathcal{U}$$

The agents simply use the partial function

$$u_t^1 = \gamma_t^1(X_t^1) \quad u_t^2 = \gamma_t^2(X_t^2)$$





The coordinator's problem is centralized



|||||

The coordinator's problem is centralized



Structure of coordinator's policy

$$(\gamma_t^1, \gamma_t^2) = \psi_t(\pi_t), \quad \pi_t = \Pr(X_t^1, X_t^2 \mid Z_{1:t-1})$$



The coordinator's problem is centralized



Structure of coordinator's policy

$$(\gamma_t^1, \gamma_t^2) = \psi_t(\pi_t), \quad \pi_t = \Pr(X_t^1, X_t^2 \mid Z_{1:t-1})$$

Structure of transmitter's policy

$$U_t^i = g_{i,t}(X_t^i, \pi_t)$$



The coordinator's problem is centralized



Structure of coordinator's policy

$$(\gamma_t^1, \gamma_t^2) = \psi_t(\pi_t), \quad \pi_t = \Pr(X_t^1, X_t^2 \mid Z_{1:t-1})$$

Structure of transmitter's policy

$$U_t^i = g_{i,t}(X_t^i, \pi_t)$$

Can be used to obtain a **dynamic programming** decomposition.



Optimal solution

© For symmetric arrival rates p

▶ If $p > \tau$, follow TDMA

▶ If $p < \tau$,

S1. If you have a packet, transmit it. If collision, one user moves to S2.

S2. Idle, then move to S1



Optimal solution

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© Same as the strategy proposed by Hluchyj and Gallager.



Optimal solution


- ◎ For symmetric arrival rates p
 - ▶ If $p > \tau$, follow TDMA
 - ▶ If $p < \tau$,
 - S1. If you have a packet, transmit it. If collision, one user moves to S2.
 - S2. Idle, then move to S1
- ◎ Same as the strategy proposed by Hluchyj and Gallager.

We can prove optimality. All previous attempts provide approximate solutions!




Application to
other problems

Delayed sharing info structure (DSIS)



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
Delayed sharing info structure (DSIS)



- ▶ K controllers that **share information with a delay** of n time steps
- ▶ $n = 0 \Rightarrow$ classical info structure (centralized system)
- ▶ $n = \infty \Rightarrow$ non-classical info structure with no sharing (completely decentralized system)



Delayed sharing info structure (DSIS)




History

- ▶ **Witsenhausen, 1971** proposed the n -DSIS and **asserted** a structure of optimal control policies
- ▶ **Varaiya and Walrand, 1979** proved that Witsenhausen's assertion is **true** for $n = 1$ but **false** for $n > 1$

- ▶ K controllers that **share information with a delay** of n time steps
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Delayed sharing info structure (DSIS)




- ▶ $n = \infty \Rightarrow$ non-classical info structure with no sharing (completely decentralized system)

History

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Delayed sharing info structure (DSIS)




$$(\gamma_t^1, \gamma_t^2) = \psi_t(\text{common info})$$

$$u_t^1 = \gamma_t^1(\text{private info})$$

$$u_t^2 = \gamma_t^2(\text{private info})$$



Delayed sharing info structure (DSIS)



$$(\gamma_t^1, \gamma_t^2) = \psi_t(\text{common info})$$

$$u_t^1 = \gamma_t^1(\text{private info})$$

$$u_t^2 = \gamma_t^2(\text{private info})$$

Structural properties


The coordinator's problem is centralized.
Can derive structure of optimal control policies.

Nayyar-M-Teneketzis, TAC 10




Other examples

Real-time communication




M-Teneketzis, TIT 09

Control over noisy channels




M-Teneketzis, SICON 09

Sensor scheduling



Shuman-Nayyar-M-et al. Proc IEEE, 10, JSTARS 10

Broadcast with feedback





M, Allerton 09




Summary of proposed method

Shedding irrelevant information





applied to




Shedding irrelevant information

Iterative procedure

- ▶ Shed irrelevant data at **an agent** (at a particular time)
- ▶ Iterate over all agents until a fixed point





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
Shedding irrelevant information

Iterative procedure



- ▶ Shed irrelevant data at **an agent** (at a particular time)
- ▶ Iterate over all agents until a fixed point
- ▶ Repeat for all **coordinators** of groups of agents




applied to



Compressing relevant information





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
Compressing relevant information

Iterative procedure

- ▶ Find **common information** between a group of agents
- ▶ Look at the problem from the p.o.v. of a **coordinator** that observes this common info, and chooses **partial functions**.





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
Compressing relevant information

Iterative procedure

- Find **common information** between a group of agents
- Look at the problem from the p.o.v. of a **coordinator** that observes this common info, and chooses **partial functions**.
- Repeat for all **groups of agents**



applied to



Automating the procedure

Automating the procedure

||||| ||||| ||||| ||||| ||||| ||||| ||||| |||||

Automating the procedure

- ① Irrelevant data, dependent rewards, conditional independence



Automating the procedure

- © Irrelevant data, dependent rewards, conditional independence

Directed acyclic graphs and graphical models



Automating the procedure

- ③ Irrelevant data, dependent rewards, conditional independence

Directed acyclic graphs and graphical models

- ③ Common information, state for input-output mapping



Automating the procedure

- ③ Irrelevant data, dependent rewards, conditional independence


Directed acyclic graphs and graphical models

- ③ Common information, state for input-output mapping

Information lattice and cuts of a lattice



An example: Real-time communication



► Hans S. Witsenhausen, **On the structure of real-time source coders**, BSJT-79.

Markov source

$$S_{t+1} = f_t(S_t, W_t)$$

Causal encoder

$$Y_t = c_t(S_{1:t}, Y_{1:t-1})$$

Finite memory decoder


$$\hat{S}_t = g_t(Y_t, M_{t-1})$$

memory update


$$M_t = l_t(Y_t, M_{t-1})$$

Minimize distortion

$$\min \mathbf{E} \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^T \rho_t(S_t, \hat{S}_t) \right\}$$



An example: Real-time communication



- ▶ Hans S. Witsenhausen, **On the structure of real-time source coders**, BSJT-79.

Automatic derivation of structural results using graphical models

M-Tatikonda, ConCom 2009, Allerton 2009

<http://pantheon.yale.edu/~am894/code/teams/>



minimize distortion

$$\min_{\mathcal{L}} \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^n \rho_t(s_t, \hat{s}_t) \right\}$$

d_1

d_2

d_3

...

d_n



Description of the problem

```
s = mkNonReward "s"      ;  $\hat{s}$  = mkNonReward " $\hat{s}$ "  
y = mkNonReward "y"      ; m = mkNonReward "m"  
r = mkReward      "r"
```

```
f = mkStochastic "f"      ; c = mkControl      "c"  
g = mkControl    "g"      ; l = mkControl    "l"  
d = mkStochastic "d"
```

```
dynamics t | t == 1 = f(1).$(s(1) .|. [])  
            ++ c(1).$(y(1) .|. [s(1)])  
            ++ g(1).$( $\hat{s}$ (1) .|. [y(1)])  
            ++ l(1).$(m(1) .|. [y(1)])  
            ++ d(1).$(r(1) .|. [s(1),  $\hat{s}$ (1)])  
| otherwise = f(t).$(s(t) .|. [s(t-1)])  
            ++ c(t).$(y(t) .|. map s[1..t] ++ map y[1..t-1])  
            ++ g(t).$( $\hat{s}$ (t) .|. [y(t), m(t-1)])  
            ++ l(t).$(m(t) .|. [y(t), m(t-1)])  
            ++ d(t).$(r(t) .|. [s(t),  $\hat{s}$ (t)])
```

```
rt = mkTeamTime dynamics 3
```



Verifying the model

```
*Data.Teams.Examples.Wit79> printTeam rt
```

```
Stochastic:
```

```
=====
```

```
f1.$.([s1].|.[])  
d1.$.([r1].|. [s1,  $\hat{s}1$ ])  
f2.$.([s2].|. [s1])  
d2.$.([r2].|. [s2,  $\hat{s}2$ ])  
f3.$.([s3].|. [s2])  
d3.$.([r3].|. [ $\hat{s}3$ , s3])
```

```
Control :
```

```
=====
```

```
y1 = c1([s1])  
 $\hat{s}1$  = g1([y1])  
m1 = l1([y1])  
y2 = c2([y1, s2, s1])  
 $\hat{s}2$  = g2([y2, m1])  
m2 = l2([y2, m1])  
y3 = c3([s3, y2, y1, s2, s1])  
 $\hat{s}3$  = g3([m2, y3])  
m3 = l3([m2, y3])
```



Simplifying the model

```
*Data.Teams.Examples.Wit79> printTeam (simplify rt)
```

```
Stochastic:
```

```
=====
```

```
f1.$.([s1].|.[])  
d1.$.([r1].|. [s1,  $\hat{s}1$ ])  
f2.$.([s2].|. [s1])  
d2.$.([r2].|. [s2,  $\hat{s}2$ ])  
f3.$.([s3].|. [s2])  
d3.$.([r3].|. [ $\hat{s}3$ , s3])
```

```
Control :
```

```
=====
```

```
y1 = c1([s1])  
 $\hat{s}1$  = g1([y1])  
m1 = l1([y1])  
y2 = c2([m1, s2])  
 $\hat{s}2$  = g2([m1, y2])  
m2 = l2([m1, y2])  
y3 = c3([m2, s3])  
 $\hat{s}3$  = g3([m2, y3])  
m3 = l3([])
```



Systematic design of decentralized systems

Structure of optimal policies

The data at the controllers increases with time, leading to a doubly exponential increase in the number of policies.

When can an agent, or a group of agents,

- ▶ shed available information
- ▶ compress available information

without loss of optimality?

Design principles

- ▶ Can we check if the optimal design of a decentralized system is tractable, **without actually designing the system?**

Search of optimal policies

- ▶ Brute force search of an optimal policy has doubly exponential complexity with time-horizon.

- ▶ How can we search for an optimal policy efficiently?

- ▶ How can we implement an optimal policy efficiently?

- ▶ Can we provide additional information to agents to make the design tractable? If so, can we find the smallest such information?



Reflections

- ◎ Non-sequential information structures
 - ▶ **Conceptual difficulties**
 - ▶ Computational difficulties



Reflections

© Non-sequential information structures

- ▶ **Conceptual difficulties**
- ▶ Computational difficulties

© Provides high-level design guidelines

- ▶ The optimal solution needs to be computed **numerically**
- ▶ Provides some design insights: structural properties, which modeling assumption makes the problem easier, etc.



Reflections

- ◎ Non-sequential information structures
 - ▶ **Conceptual difficulties**
 - ▶ Computational difficulties
- ◎ Provides high-level design guidelines
 - ▶ The optimal solution needs to be computed **numerically**
 - ▶ Provides some design insights: structural properties, which modeling assumption makes the problem easier, etc.
- ◎ Actual solution requires simplification and approximation based on “domain knowledge”



Thank you

