Planning (and learning) in multi-agent teams

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Common theme: multi-stage multi-agent decision making under uncertainty





















Challenges

Signals sent over wireless channels (packet drops)







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Different vehicles have different information







Challenges

Signals sent over wireless channels (packet drops)

Different vehicles have different information

- Decentralized control
- Decentralized estimation
- Decentralized learning











Multiple agents Agents have different information and operate in stochastic dynamic environments









Multiple agents	Agents have different information and operate in stochastic dynamic environments		
		Link A a_t^i Agent i	
Decentralized Coordination	All agents must coordinate to achieve a system-wide objective	Agent 1 Environment	
Communication & Signaling	Possible to explicitly or implicitly communicate information	Link B ut Agent n	



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Teams versus Games

Teams vs Games

Teams

- > All agents have **common objective**
- Agents cooperate to minimize team cost
- Agents are not strategic
- Solution concepts: person-by-person optimality, global optimality . . .

Games

- Each agent has individual objective
- Agents compete to minimize individual cost
- Agents are strategic
- Solution concepts: Nash equilibrium, Bayesian Nash, Subgame perfect equilibrium, Markov perfect equilibrium, Bayesian perfect equilibrium, ...



Teams vs Games

Teams

- All agents have common objective
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- Solution concents: nerson-hv-nerson

Games

- Each agent has individual objective
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In many engineering problems, game theory is used as an algorithmic toolbox to provide distributed solutions to static problems.

We are interested in finding **globally optimal** solution to problems where **agents have decentralized information**.

Teams have a reputation of being notoriously difficult . . .



About 300 years of knowledge in designing LTI systems

S&C until the 1960s Good "intuitive" understanding of frequency domain methods

• Root locus • Bode plots • Nyquist plots • Loop shaping



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Advances in 1960s

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Emergence of state space methods for filtering and control

Could be implemented in digital computers (of that time!)



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	Linearize the system dynamics
	Design optimal control assuming full state feedback (LQR) control action(t) = -gain(t) · state(t)
State Space Deisgn	Estimate the state using noisy measurements (Kalman filtering) state estimate(t) = Function(estimate(t-1), measurement(t).
	Optimal controller: control action(t) = -gain(t) · state estimate(t)

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Conceptual difficulties in team problems

A two step dynamical system with two controllers

Linear dynamics, quadratic cost, and Gaussian disturbance

Witsenhausen Counterexample

Non-linear controllers outperform linear control strategies

... cannot use Kalman filtering + Riccati equations

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	Infinite horizon dynamical system with two symmetric controllers		
Whittle and Rudge	Linear dynamics, quadratic cost, and Gaussian disturbance		
Example	A priori restrict attention to linear controllers		
•	Best linear controllers don't have finite dimensional representation		

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•	⊳	Best linear controllers don't have finite dimensional representation		

> All random variables are finite valued

Complexity analysis

- Finite horizon setup
- > The problem of finding the best control strategy is in **NEXP**
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Why are team problems hard?

Why are team problems hard?

Why are single agent problems easy?

$$S = 0 \quad S = 1 \quad S = 2 \quad S = 3$$

$$A = 0 \quad 0.5 \quad 0.2 \quad 1.2 \quad 0.5$$

$$A = 1 \quad 1.2 \quad 0.5 \quad 0.2 \quad 0.3$$

Y = 1

Y = 0

$$\min_{\pi: \mathfrak{Y} \to \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E}[c(\mathfrak{S}, \pi(\mathfrak{Y}))]$$



$$S = 0 \quad S = 1 \quad S = 2 \quad S = 3$$

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 $S = 1$
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 $S = 3$
 0.5
 0.2
 1.2
 0.5
 1.2
 0.5
 0.2
 0.3

$$Y = 0 \qquad \qquad Y = 1$$









Multi-agent Teams-(Mahajan)

 $\min_{\pi: \mathcal{Y} \to \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E}[c(S, \pi(Y))]$

$$S = 0 \quad S = 1 \quad S = 2 \quad S = 3$$

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$$Y = 0 \qquad \qquad Y = 1$$









> This is a **functional optimization** problem.

> Search complexity $|\mathcal{A}|^{|\mathcal{Y}|}$.

 $\min_{\pi: \mathcal{Y} \to \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E}[c(S, \pi(Y))]$

A

$$S = 0 \quad S = 1 \quad S = 2 \quad S = 3$$
$$= 0 \quad 0.5 \quad 0.2 \quad 1.2 \quad 0.5$$

 $\min_{\pi: \mathcal{Y} \to \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E}[c(S, \pi(Y))]$







- > This is a **functional optimization** problem.
- Search complexity $|\mathcal{A}|^{|\mathcal{Y}|}$.

 $\label{eq:star} \text{for each } \boldsymbol{y}, \quad \min_{\boldsymbol{a} \in \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E}[\boldsymbol{c}(\boldsymbol{S}, \boldsymbol{a}) \mid \boldsymbol{Y} = \boldsymbol{y}]$

- Each sub-problem is a **parameter optimization** problem.
- Search complexity $|\mathcal{A}| \cdot |\mathcal{Y}|$.





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Dyanmics	$S_{t+1} = f_t(S_t, A_t, W_t)$	
Observations	$Y_t = h_t^i(S_t, N_t)$	
Control law	$A_{t} = \pi_{t}(Y_{1:t}, A_{1:t-1})$	



	///// ronr /////	nent
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 $\label{eq:stars} \begin{array}{l} \mbox{Dyanmics} & S_{t+1} = f_t(S_t, A_t, W_t) \\ \\ \mbox{Observations} & Y_t = h_t^i(S_t, N_t) \end{array}$

Control law $A_t = \pi_t(Y_{1:t}, A_{1:t-1})$

Objective $\begin{array}{l} \mbox{Choose control strategy } \pi &= \\ (\pi_1,...,\pi_T) \mbox{ to minimize} \\ J(\pi) = \mathbb{E}\Big[\sum_{t=1}^T c_t(S_t,A_t)\Big] \end{array}$



Environme	ent	Dyanmics	$S_{t+1} = f_t(S_t, A_t, W_t)$	
A _t Y _t		Observations	$Y_t = h_t^i(S_t, N_t)$	
Controller		Control law	$A_t = \pi_t(Y_{1:t}, A_{1:t-1})$	
			Choose control strategy $\pi~=$	
Dynamic	Define belief	Define belief state $b_t = P(S_t Y_{1:t}, A_{1:t-1})$.		
rogramming \triangleright Write a DP in terms of the belief state b_t .				
solution	lution Solution complexity: $T \cdot A \cdot Z $.			



Multi-agent Teams-(Mahajan)

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Why don't these simplifications work for teams?

Static team problem

$\min_{\pi^1,\pi^2} \mathbb{E}[c(S,\pi^1(Y^1),\pi^2(Y^2))]$


$\min_{\pi^1,\pi^2} \mathbb{E}[c(S,\pi^1(Y^1),\pi^2(Y^2))]$





 $\min_{\pi^1,\pi^2} \mathbb{E}[c(S,\pi^1(Y^1),\pi^2(Y^2))]$

Agent 1	



 $\min_{\pi^1,\pi^2} \mathbb{E}[c(S,\pi^1(Y^1),\pi^2(Y^2))]$





 $\min_{\pi^1,\pi^2} \mathbb{E}[c(S,\pi^1(Y^1),\pi^2(Y^2))]$



Previous idea of for all y^1 , $\min_{a^1} \mathbb{E}[c(S, a^1, \pi^2(Y^2)) | Y^1 = y^1]$ leads to person-by-person optimal solution (not globally opt) Multi-agent Teams-(Mahajan)

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k-step delayed sharing information structure

- Consider a network with coupled dynamics.
- Information exchange between nodes with unit delay.





k-step delayed sharing information structure

- Consider a network with coupled dynamics.
- Information exchange between nodes with unit delay.

Fix the strategy of all but two subsystems which are k-hop apart. What is the best response strategy at these two nodes?

Multi-agent Teams-(Mahajan)



💷 Witsenhausen, "Separation of Esitmation and Control for Discrete-Time Systems," Proc. IEEE, 1971.



k-step delayed sharing information structure

- Consider a network with coupled dynamics.
- Information exchange between nodes with unit delay.

- Fix the strategy of all but two subsystems which are k-hop apart. What is the best response strategy at these two nodes?
- Proposed by Witsenhausen in a seminal paper.
- Allows to smoothly transition between centralized (k = 0) and completely decentral-

ized ($k = \infty$). Witsenhausen, "Separation of Esitmation and Control for Discrete-Time Systems," Proc. IEEE, 1971. Multi-agent Teams-(Mahajan)



System Model



Dyanmics $S_{t+1} = f_t(S_t, A_t^1, A_t^2, W_t)$ Observations $Y_t^i = h_t^i(S_t, N_t^i)$



System Model



Dyanmics $S_{t+1} = f_t(S_t, A_t^1, A_t^2, W_t)$

Observations $Y_t^i = h_t^i(S_t, N_t^i)$

Information	$\tau i $ $(\nu i $ $\lambda i $ $\nu - i $ $\lambda - i $)
Structure	$I_{t}^{i} = \{Y_{1:t}^{i}, A_{1:t-1}^{i}Y_{1:t-k}^{-i}, A_{1:t-k}^{-i}\}$

Control law
$$A_t^i = \pi_t^i(I_t^i)$$



System Model



Dyanmics $S_{t+1} = f_t(S_t, A_t^1, A_t^2, W_t)$

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Control law $A_t^i = \pi_t^i(I_t^i)$

Objective Choose control strategies (π_1, π_2) to minimize $J(\pi_1, \pi_2) = \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=1}^{T} c_t(S_t, A_t^1, A_t^2)\right]$

The data I_t^i available at each controller is increasing with time. How to find a sufficient statistic or an information state?



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▶ Unobserved state from the p.o.v. of ctrl 1: S_t, L_t^2, C_t . Information state $\pi_t^1 = \mathbb{P}(S_t, L_t^2, C_t | L_t^1, C_t)$.



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- ▷ Unobserved state from the p.o.v. of ctrl 1: S_t, L_t^2, C_t . Information state $\pi_t^1 = \mathbb{P}(S_t, L_t^2, C_t | L_t^1, C_t)$.
- Unobserved state from the p.o.v. of ctrl 2: S_t, π_t^1 . Information state $\pi_t^2 = \mathbb{P}(S_t, \pi_t^1 | L_t^2, C_t)$.



The data I_t^i available at each controller is increasing with time. How to find a sufficient statistic or an information state?



- ▷ Unobserved state from the p.o.v. of ctrl 1: S_t, L_t^2, C_t . Information state $\pi_t^1 = \mathbb{P}(S_t, L_t^2, C_t | L_t^1, C_t)$.
- ▷ Unobserved state from the p.o.v. of ctrl 2: S_t, π_t^1 . Information state $\pi_t^2 = \mathbb{P}(S_t, \pi_t^1 | L_t^2, C_t)$.
- ▷ Unobserved state from the p.o.v. of ctrl 1: S_t, π_t^2 . Information state $\pi_t^{1,2} = \mathbb{P}(S_t, \pi_t^2 | L_t^2, C_t)$.
- ▶ ... infinite regress ...



The data I_t^i available at each controller is increasing with time. How to find a sufficient statistic or an information state?





History of the problem

Witsenhausen's Assertion
$$\begin{split} \text{Let } C_t = \{Y_{1:t-k}, A_{1:t-k}\} \text{ and } L_t^i = \{Y_{t-k+1:t}^i, A_{t-k+1:t-1}^i\}.\\ \text{Then } \mathbb{P}(S_{t-k} \mid C_t) \text{ is a sufficient statistic for } C_t. \end{split}$$

Rationale: $\mathbb{P}(S_{t-k}|Y_{1:t-k}, A_{1:t-k})$ is policy independent.

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History of the problem

Witsenhausen's Assertion	$\begin{split} \text{Let } C_t = \{Y_{1:t-k}, A_{1:t-k}\} \text{ and } L_t^i = \{Y_{t-k+1:t}^i, A_{t-k+1:t-1}^i\}.\\ \text{Then } \mathbb{P}(S_{t-k} \mid C_t) \text{ is a sufficient statistic for } C_t.\\ \text{Rationale: } \mathbb{P}(S_{t-k} Y_{1:t-k}, A_{1:t-k}) \text{ is policy independent.} \end{split}$
Follow-up Literature	 Assertion true for k = 1 [Sandell, Athans, 1974], [Kurtaran, 1976] Assertion false for k > 1 [Varaiya, Walrand 1979], [Yoshikawa, Kobayashi, 1978] No subsequent positive result!

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History of the problem

Witsenhausen's Assertion	Let $C_t = \{Y_{1:t-k}, A_{1:t-k}\}$ and $L_t^i = \{Y_{t-k+1:t}^i, A_{t-k+1:t-1}^i\}$. Then $\mathbb{P}(S_{t-k} C_t)$ is a sufficient statistic for C_t . Rationale : $\mathbb{P}(S_{t-k} Y_{1:t-k}, A_{1:t-k})$ is policy independent.
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Are there sufficient statistics or information states for C_t ?

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Importance of the problem

		Power systems: Altman et al, 2009
Applications		Queueing theory: Kuri and Kumar, 1995
(of one-step		Communication networks: Grizzle et al, 1982
delay sharing)	⊳	Stochastic games: Papavassilopoulos, 1982; Chang and Cruz, '83
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Conceptual Significance Understanding the design of networked control systems
 Bridge between centralized and decentralized systems
 Insights for the design of general decentralized systems.



Common information approach for teams [Nayyar, Mahajan, Teneketzis (2011, 2013)]



































Split $Y^1 = (L^1, C)$ and $Y^2 = (L^2, C)$. for all c, $\min_{\gamma^1,\gamma^2} \mathbb{E}[c(S,\gamma^1(L^1),\gamma^2(L^2))) \mid C = c]$ Reduction in complexity: $|\mathcal{A}|^8 \cdot |\mathcal{A}|^8$ to $4|\mathcal{A}|^2 \cdot |\mathcal{A}|^2$ Multi-agent Teams-(Mahajan)



Original System





Original System



Virtual Coordinated System





Original System





	⊳	Common information: $C_t = I_t^1 \cap I_t^2 = \{Y_{1:t-k}, A_{1:t-k}\}$
Information split	⊳	Local information: $L_t^i = I_t^i \setminus C_t = \{Y_{t-k+1:t}^i, A_{t-k+1:t-1}^i\}.$
	⊳	Prescription: $\gamma_t^i: L_t^i \mapsto A_t^i$.



- The virtual coordinator is a single agent stochastic ctrl problem.
- ► Information state: for C_t : $b_t = \mathbb{P}(S_t, L_t^1, L_t^2 C_t, \gamma_{1:t-1}^1, \gamma_{1:t-1}^2)$.

Main Result

Dynamic program: V_{T+1}(b) = 0 and $V_t(b_t) = \min_{\gamma_t^1, \gamma_t^2} \{ \mathbb{E}[c_t(S_t, A_t^1, A_t^2) + V_{t+1}(B_t) \mid b_t, \gamma_t^1, \gamma_t^2] \}.$

Each step of the DP is a **functional** optimization problem.



	⊳	The virtual coordinator is a single agent stochastic ctrl problem
	⊳	Information state : for C_t : $b_t = \mathbb{P}(S_t, L_t^1, L_t^2 C_t, \gamma_{1:t-1}^1, \gamma_{1:t-1}^2)$.
Main Result	⊳	Dynamic program : $V_{T+1}(b) = 0$ and
		$V_{t}(b_{t}) = \min_{\gamma_{t}^{1}, \gamma_{t}^{2}} \{ \mathbb{E}[c_{t}(S_{t}, A_{t}^{1}, A_{t}^{2}) + V_{t+1}(B_{+}) \mid b_{t}, \gamma_{t}^{1}, \gamma_{t}^{2}] \}.$
		Each step of the DP is a functional optimization problem.

	The virtual coordinator is purely for conceptual clarity as it al-
Salient Features	lows us to view the original problem from the p.o.v. of a "higher
	authority". The presence of the coordinator is not necessary.
	The common information is known to both controllers and there-
	fore both of them can carry out the calculations to solve the DP

on their own.

The general common-info approach



> n controllers with general info structure $\{I_t^i\}_{i=1}^n$.



The general common-info approach



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nformation Split	Δ	Common information : $C_t = \bigcap_{s \ge t} \bigcap_{i=1}^{n} I_s^i$.
	⊳	$eq:local_$


The general common-info approach



> n controllers with general info structure $\{I_t^i\}_{i=1}^n$.

Information Split	Δ	Common information : $C_t = \bigcap_{s \ge t} \bigcap_{i=1}^{n} I_s^i$.
	⊳	$eq:local_$
Partial history sharing		$\begin{split} L^i_t \text{ is uniformly bounded.} \\ \mathbb{P}^\psi(C_{t+1} \smallsetminus C_t \mid C_t, \gamma^1_t, \gamma^2_t) \\ \text{ doesn't depend on } \psi. \end{split}$



The general common-info approach



The general common-info approach



Common information resolves conceptual difficulties in decentralized control.

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Hey, but this is an RL workshop!

Learning in dynamic teams

Implications of common-info approach

- Converts planning in multi-agent teams to a POMDP
- In the learning setting, use your favorite RL algo for POMDP at the coordinator (offline traning) or each agent's local copy of the coordinator (online training)
- Beautiful theory ... doesn't work in practice.
- Too complicated. The action space is too large.

Learning in dynamic teams

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Practical MARL algorithms Many SOTA MARL algos build on the common-info approach BAD (Bayesian action decoder), SOTA on Hannabi CAPI (cooperative approximate policy iteration), SOTA on Tiny-Bridge



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Practical MARL algorithms Many SOTA MARL algos build on the common-info approach BAD (Bayesian action decoder), SOTA on Hannabi CAPI (cooperative approximate policy iteration), SOTA on Tiny-Bridge

But no theory! How do we develop RL theory MARL?



Tentative Roadmap for MARL Theory

Step 1 RL for POMDPs Simplest "MARL" environment. Theory still lacking.

We have recent results that resolve key conceptual challenges

Could generalize to MARL using common-info approach



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Step 2 Centralized vs decentralized training

▶ Most MARL algos use centralized training.

Some recent preliminary results for analysis of centralized training.

Some empirical results on decentralized training.

Tentative Roadmap for MARL Theory

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Next Steps

Credit assignment (among agents)

Agents helping each other to learning



How are we doing on time?

Approximate Information States for POMDPs

Key solution concept: Information state

Informally, an information state is a compression of information which is sufficient for performance evaluation and predicting itself.



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Historical overview

- Old concept. May be viewed as as generalization of the notion of state (Nerode, 1958).
 Informal definitions given in Kwakernaak (1965), Bohlin (1970), Davis and Varaiya (1972), Kumar and Varaiya (1986) but no formal analysis.
- Related to but different from concepts such bisimulation, predictive state representations (PSR), and ε -machines.



Information state: Definition

Given a state space $\ensuremath{\mathbb{X}}$, an INFORMATION STATE GENERATOR is a tuple of

- \blacktriangleright history compression functions $\{\sigma_t \colon \mathcal{H}_t \to \mathcal{I}\}_{t \geqslant 1}$
- \blacktriangleright reward function $\hat{r}: \mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$
- ▶ transition kernel $\hat{P} : \mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{A} \to \Delta(\mathcal{Z})$

which satisfies two properties:

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- which satisfies two properties:

(P1) The reward function \hat{r} is sufficient for performance evaluation:

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathsf{R}_t \mid \mathsf{H}_t = \mathsf{h}_t, \mathsf{A}_t = \mathfrak{a}_t] = \hat{r}(\sigma_t(\mathsf{h}_t), \mathfrak{a}_t).$$

Information state: Definition

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which satisfies two properties:

(P1) The reward function \hat{r} is sufficient for performance evaluation:

$$\mathbb{E}[R_t \mid H_t = h_t, A_t = a_t] = \hat{r}(\sigma_t(h_t), a_t).$$

(P2) The transition kernel \hat{P} is sufficient for predicting the info state: $\mathbb{P}(Z_{t+1} \in B \mid H_t = h_t, A_t = a_t) = \hat{P}(B \mid \sigma_t(h_t), a_t).$



Information state: Key result

An information state **always** leads to a dynamic programming decomposition.



Information state: Key result

An information state **always** leads to a dynamic programming decomposition.

Let $\{Z_t\}_{t \ge 1}$ be any information state process. Let \hat{V} be the fixed point of:

$$\hat{V}(z) = \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left\{ \hat{r}(z, a) + \gamma \int_{\mathcal{Z}} \hat{V}(z_{+}) \hat{P}(dz_{+}|z, a) \right\}$$

Let $\pi^*(z)$ denote the arg max of the RHS. Then, the policy $\pi = (\pi_t)_{t \ge 1}$ given by $\pi_t = \pi^* \circ \sigma_t$ is optimal.



Examples of information state

Markov decision processes (MDP)

Current state \boldsymbol{S}_t is an info state

POMDP

Belief state is an info state



Examples of information state

Markov decision processes (MDP)

Current state S_t is an info state

MDP with delayed observations

$$(S_{t-\delta+1},A_{t-\delta+1:t-1})$$
 is an info state

POMDP

Belief state is an info state

POMDP with delayed observations

$$(\mathbb{P}(S_{t-\delta}|Y_{1:t-\delta},A_{1:t-\delta}),A_{t-\delta+1:t-1})$$
 is info state



Examples of information state

Markov decision processes (MDP)MDP with delayed observationsCurrent state S_t is an info state $(S_{t-\delta+1}, A_{t-\delta+1:t-1})$ is an info statePOMDPPOMDP with delayed observationsBelief state is an info state $(\mathbb{P}(S_{t-\delta}|Y_{1:t-\delta}, A_{1:t-\delta}), A_{t-\delta+1:t-1})$

is info state

Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG)

The state estimate $\mathbb{E}[S_t|H_t]$ is an info state

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Machine Maintenance

 (τ, S^+_{τ}) is info state, where τ is the time of last maintenance





And now to Approximate Information States ...

Main idea

Info state is defined in terms of two properties (P1) & (P2).
 An AIS is a process which safisfies these approximately

Show that AIS always leads to approx. DP

Recover (and improve up on) many existing results



An (ε, δ) -APPROXIMATE INFORMATION STATE (AIS) generator is a tuple $(\sigma_t, \hat{r}, \hat{P})$ which approximately satisfies (P1) and (P2):



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An (ε, δ) -APPROXIMATE INFORMATION STATE (AIS) generator is a tuple $(\sigma_t, \hat{r}, \hat{P})$ which approximately satisfies (P1) and (P2): (AP1) \hat{r} is sufficient for approximate performance evaluation: $|\mathbb{E}[\mathsf{R}_t | \mathsf{H}_t = \mathsf{h}_t, \mathsf{A}_t = \mathfrak{a}_t] - \hat{r}(\sigma_t(\mathsf{h}_t), \mathfrak{a}_t)| \leq \varepsilon$



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Results depend on the choice of metric on probability spaces



Examples of AIS



What is the loss in performance if we choose a policy using the simulation model and use it in the real world?





What is the loss in performance if we choose a policy using the simulation model and use it in the real world?

Model mismatch as an AIS

 $\blacktriangleright \text{ (Identity, } \hat{P}, \hat{r}) \text{ is an } (\varepsilon, \delta) \text{-AIS with } \varepsilon = \sup_{s, a} \left| r(s, a) - \hat{r}(s, a) \right| \text{ and } \delta_{\mathfrak{F}} = \sup_{s, a} d_{\mathfrak{F}}(P(\cdot | s, a), \hat{P}(\cdot | s, a)).$





Müller, "How does the value function of a Markov decision process depend on the transition probabilities?" MOR 1997.

Model mismatch as an AIS

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$\mathrm{d}_{\mathfrak{F}}$ is total variation

$$V(s) - V^{\pi}(s) \leqslant rac{2arepsilon}{1 - \gamma} + rac{\gamma\delta\operatorname{span}(r)}{(1 - \gamma)^2}$$

Recover bounds of Müller (1997).





- Müller, "How does the value function of a Markov decision process depend on the transition probabilities?" MOR 1997.
- E Asadi, Misra, Littman, "Lipscitz continuity in model-based reinfocement learning," ICML 2018.

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Recover bounds of Müller (1997).

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$d_{\mathfrak{F}}$ is Wasserstein distance

$$V(s) - V^{\pi}(s) \leq \frac{2\varepsilon}{1 - \gamma} + \frac{2\gamma\delta L_{r}}{(1 - \gamma)(1 - \gamma L_{p})}$$

Recover bounds of Asadi, Misra, Littman (2018)

Example 2: Feature abstraction in MDPs



What is the loss in performance if we choose a policy using the abstract model and use it in the original model?



Example 2: Feature abstraction in MDPs



What is the loss in performance if we choose a policy using the abstract model and use it in the original model?

$$(\varphi, \hat{P}, \hat{r}) \text{ is an } (\varepsilon, \delta) \text{-AIS with } \varepsilon = \sup_{s, \alpha} |r(s, \alpha) - \hat{r}(\varphi(s), \alpha)|$$

and
$$\delta_{\mathfrak{F}} = \sup_{s,a} d_{\mathfrak{F}}(P(\phi^{-1}(\cdot)|s,a), \hat{P}(\cdot|\phi(s),a)).$$


Example 2: Feature abstraction in MDPs



 $d_{\mathfrak{F}}$ is total variation

$$V(s) - V^{\pi}(s) \leqslant \frac{2\varepsilon}{1-\gamma} + \frac{\gamma \delta_{\mathfrak{F}} \operatorname{span}(r)}{(1-\gamma)^2}$$

Improve bounds of Abel et al. (2016)

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Abel, Hershkowitz, Littman, "Near optimal behavior via approximate state abstraction," ICML 2016.

and
$$\delta_{\mathfrak{F}} = \sup_{s,a} d_{\mathfrak{F}}(P(\phi^{-1}(\cdot)|s,a), \hat{P}(\cdot|\phi(s),a)).$$



Example 2: Feature abstraction in MDPs



- Abel, Hershkowitz, Littman, "Near optimal behavior via approximate state abstraction," ICML 2016.
- Gelada, Kumar, Buckman, Nachum, Bellemare, "DeepMDP: Learning continuous latent space models for representation learning," ICML 2019.

$$(\varphi, \hat{\mathsf{P}}, \hat{\mathsf{r}}) \text{ is an } (\varepsilon, \delta) \text{-AIS with } \varepsilon = \sup_{s, a} |\mathsf{r}(s, a) - \hat{\mathsf{r}}(\varphi(s), a)|$$

$d_{\mathfrak{F}}$ is total variation

$$V(s) - V^{\pi}(s) \leqslant \frac{2\varepsilon}{1 - \gamma} + \frac{\gamma \delta_{\mathfrak{F}} \operatorname{span}(r)}{(1 - \gamma)^2}$$

Improve bounds of Abel et al. (2016)

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and $\delta_{\mathfrak{F}} = \sup d_{\mathfrak{F}}(P(\phi^{-1}(\cdot)|s, \mathfrak{a}), \hat{P}(\cdot|\phi(s), \mathfrak{a}))$.

 $d_{\mathfrak{F}}$ is Wasserstein distance

$$V(s) - V^{\pi}(s) \leqslant \frac{2\varepsilon}{1 - \gamma} + \frac{2\gamma \delta_{\mathfrak{F}} \|\hat{V}\|_{\mathsf{Lip}}}{(1 - \gamma)^2}$$

Recover bounds of Gelada et al. (2019).

Example 3: Belief approximation in POMDPs





What is the loss in performance if we choose a policy using the approximate beliefs and use it in the original model?

Belief space

Quantized beliefs



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Example 3: Belief approximation in POMDPs



What is the loss in performance if we choose a policy using the approximate beliefs and use it in the original model?

Belief space

Quantized beliefs

Belief approximation in POMDPs

> Quantized cells of radius ε (in terms of total variation) are $(\varepsilon ||r||_{\infty}, 3\varepsilon)$ -AIS.



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Example 3: Belief approximation in POMDPs



Francois-Lavet, Rabusseau, Pineau, Ernst, Fonteneau, "On overfitting and asymptotic bias in batch reinforcement learning with partial observability," JAIR 2019.

Belief space

Quantized beliefs

Belief approximation in POMDPs

• Quantized cells of radius ε (in terms of total variation) are $(\varepsilon \|r\|_{\infty}, 3\varepsilon)$ -AIS.

$$V(s) - V^{\pi}(s) \leq \frac{2\varepsilon \|\mathbf{r}\|_{\infty}}{1 - \gamma} + \frac{6\gamma\varepsilon \|\mathbf{r}\|_{\infty}}{(1 - \gamma)^2}$$

Improve bounds of Francois Lavet et al. (2019) by a factor of $1/(1-\gamma)$.

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Thus, the notion of AIS unifies many of the approximation results in the literature, both for MDPs and POMDPs.

Hey, this is an RL workshop remember



From approximation bounds to reinforcement learning...









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Value approximator

- ▶ Use a NN to approx. action-value function $Q: \mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}.$
- Update the parameters to minimize temporal difference loss

Reinforcement learning setup



Policy approximator

- ▶ Use a NN to approx. policy $\pi: \mathcal{Z} \to \Delta(\mathcal{A})$.
- ▷ Use policy gradient theorem to efficiently compute $\nabla J(\pi)$.

Value approximator

AIS Generator

AIS

Decoder

Value

approx.

- ▶ Use a NN to approx. action-value function $Q: \mathbb{Z} \times \mathcal{A} \to \mathbb{R}.$
- Update the parameters to minimize temporal difference loss